时间：2020年4月17日（周五上午），9:00 – 10:30
9:00 – 10:30
报告题目：The value of pre-contract information about an agent’s ability in the presence of moral hazard and adverse
报告人：Shaopeng Li (Temple University)
摘要：We analyze the expected value of information about an agent’s type in the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection. Information about the agent’s type enables the principal to sort/screen agents of different types. The value of the information decreases in the variability of output and the agent’s risk aversion, two factors that are typically associated with the severity of the moral hazard problem. However, the value of the information about agent type first increases but ultimately decreases in the severity of adverse selection. The decrease comes about because the means available to the principal to induce effort—namely, the pay–performance sensitivity—must also be used to sort/screen agents, and these two goals conflict. This decline in value occurs despite the monotonically increasing importance of the information in determining the principal’s expected profits. Further, we show that the peak value of information occurs at a predictable level of adverse selection. These results imply that over some range, the importance of the information will be increasing, and the value of the information will be simultaneously decreasing, in the severity of adverse selection.
报告人简介：李少鹏，美国天普大学Fox商学院会计学博士。研究方向为分析式会计理论、公司绩效、管理控制、委托代理理论、数据包络分析，以及成本会计。研究成果发表在Journal of Accounting Research，有多篇工作论文被AAA Annual Conference和AAA MAS Conference等国际会议录用。